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INTRQDUCTIOH

In the following essay an attempt has been made to

examine certain aspects of those ihilosophies whose theories
of mind have contributed to the riches of philosophical

thought.

The essay deals with some of the main contributions

in the study of mind.

We consider the endeavours of those

philosophers who have boldly faced an incredibly complex problem and have speculated concerning the most amazing wonder of
all

— the

human mind and its place in nature.

Is mind something aloof from nature,

endowed with a

divine capacity for forming Judgments and attaining to a

knowledge of truth, or is mind nothing more than a part of
the physical structure of things?

This question has impelled philosophers to range themselves into different schools of belief which can be roughly

divided into two groups.

Those whose speculations take them

into the metaphysics of mind as soul, unique in a physical
cosmos, and those who see mind as a phenomenon of nature,

very wonderful but tinged with a certain melancholy, for by

mind man is not only eware of himself, but is aware of his
own fragility and of his own ultimate extinction.
Our problem is to review some of these philosophical
sources and to try to determine how (if at all) these several

divisions converge and flow into a common channel of belief.

What is the nature of mind?

Some philosophers maintain that

to resolve this problem we must first ascertain what it is

that mind does and proceed in the light of this knowledge.

Others although not disparaging the activities of the mind,

believe that we are dealing with two distinct realms of being
and our task is not to attempt to determine the nature of

mind from what it does but to determine the nature of that
rapport which exists between them.
In the light of this problem our essay deals with these

several beliefs and attempts to evaluate their conclusions.

CHAPTER

I

GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS
The early Greek philosopher Reraclitus was led to what
he considered to be the universal nature of the cosmic

process, that of opposition and the elimination of opposition.
The whole of life was in rrocess, wherein,

''Nothing-

ever is,

1

everything is becoming'

4

.

Life was purely transition in

which strife played a major role.
In the world of ideas the same universal form is applicable, for ideas are the result of a complicated process of

elimination.

One idea contends against another until the

more durable concept finds a permanent place for itself in
thought.

One alternative process of reasoning eliminates

another.

It is a "continual flow" or strife.
»

The problem implicit in his reasoning is basic to all

ages and to all stages of philosophical enquiry.

Can we re-

solve the nature of this seeming conflict, not only in nature
metaphysics?
as a physical phenomenon, but alBo in the realm of

Platonic
We shall start with an attempt to understand the
and the
theses regarding man's ability to apprehend reality

reliability of such apprehension.

1
2

Adam &
John Burnet, Early C-reek Philosophy (Edinburgh:
Charles Bl»ok, 1892), Vol. 1, p. 149.
Regan,
A H Benn, The GreeK Philosophers (London.
Vol. 1, T-. 171.
Paul', Trench & Co., 1882)
.

,

,

2

THE PLATONIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Much of our knowledge of the external world is mere
opinion for It Is a passive acceptance of sense experience.
It is without thought and is deceptive.

The evidence of a

tutored mind is to be seen in the ability to distinguish the
real from the imaginary.

This faculty of understanding prompts

one to seek reasons for one

!

e

opinions.

To wonder, and to try

to find out why certain things are as they are or why they

behave as they do is the beginning of philosophy.

Thus man

takes his first ster in the pursuit of knowledge.

He ascends

from the particular objects of sensory experience to the ap-

prehension of universal laws and relationships.
It is true that knowledge begins with sense experience,

but the senses alone cannot attain to a knowledge of truth.
The senses contemplate only Imperfect copies of reality.

".;e

are like prisoners in a cave, who, watching by firelight,
see the flickering shadows upon the wall of the cave and be-

lieve them to be real.

Nor is it simply a matter of turning

around and looking upon the substance of the shadows which
they see, for their eyes would be dazzled and blinded by
their long sojourn in the gloom of the cave.
M

The entire allegory,

I

said, you may now append, dear

Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison house in the

world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will
not misapprehend me if you interpret the Journey upwards to
be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according

—

.

3

to my poor belief, which at your desire, I have expressed

whether rightly or wrongly God knows"

3

It is the intellect which is able to move in a wider

range than the senses which grasps the truths which sensible

experience oannot perceive.

It is intellect which is able to

discern the universal forms which lie outside of sensible

experience and gives to us a world whose construction is
It is not an unordered flux of sense data but

intelligible.

is made up of ideas which are discernible in the forms,

verifiable by reason and possessing real existence.
Without this belief, knowledge is reduced to a fluctuating and indecisive experience of the senses and nothing is
stable.
M

Plato takes this up fully with young Theaetetus.

Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us

3oc.

but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras,
that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who
is not?
I suppose the last.

Theaet.
Soc.

Then it must appear so to each of them?

Theaet.
Soc.

And

Theaet.
Soc.

3.

Yes.
1

appears to him

4

means the same as 'he perceives

True.

The appearing and perceiving coincide in the case

Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato. Vol. I, p. 776.
(Republic, Bk. VII).
New York: Random House, 19*0

B.

.

1

.

"

of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear,

or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives

k

them?

Thus Plato shows how the reliability of sense data can
be questioned, and indeed, can be reduced to a series of

contradictory -phenomena.

He repudiates the claim of Protagoras

that "Man is the measure of all things"

bility of the phenomena of sensations.

because of the falli-

,

As Plato points out,

the theory that knowledge is identical with sense perception
is merely to substitute an individual for a universal standard
5
of truth.
Nor is it possible to test the veracity of sensa-

tions per se, for such phenomena cannot be tested as to their

truth or falsity.

The phenomena can only be referred to the

mind and the question becomes, not, are the senses themselves

fallacious, but are the Judgements formed by the mind as to
the meaning of the sense phenomena valid.

Plato believed that the mind can not only compare one
series of sensations with another, but can compare sensations
in retrospect and belonging to past experiences.

This is

possible because the sensations are referred to some stable

criterion of Judgement which is Implicit in a theory of
ideas as a theor y of Being .

THE PLATONIC THEORY OF IDEAS

Plato in his theory of ideas attempts to classify true
4.
5.

Theaetetus,
A. y. Benn,

qp_.
op_.

cit . Vol. II, p. 153cit., Vol. I, p. 206.
,

5

knowledge and to separate it from mere opinion.

Knowledge

therefore, as distinct from opinion must be knowledge of

reality itself.

The fundamental principle of the metaphysical

epistemology of Plato is that there are two distinct worlds

which must be distinguished,

"...that which is and has no
6

becoming; and... that which is always becoming and never is."

Here we have this dualistic conception of the world of

reason on the one hand, and the world of perceptual relationships only, on the other.
It is interesting to note that Plato developed his

doctrine of ideas from the failure of Heraclitus and the

philosophers of £lea to explain Being and Becoming.

Heraclitus

taught that Becoming alone could be postulated as having

existence, while Being never is.

The Eleatics on the con-

trary were equally adamant that Being does exist while

Becoming never is.
Plato took the obvious step in assuming that in this

changing world, that which is unchangeable and absolute
must be real.

It is the idea which is the ground of ascer-

tainable knowledge and the reality of Being.

"Which of the patterns had the Artificer in view when
he made the

world— the pattern

which is created?

cf the unchangeable,

or that

If the world be indeed fair and the

artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to

6.

B. Jowett,

m.

cit., Vol. II, p. 12.

(Timaeus)

—

.

6

that which is eternal; but if what oannot be said without

blasphemy is true, then too the created pattern.

Every one

will see that he must have looked to the eternal; for the

world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of
causes.

And having been created in this way, the world has

been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by

reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must of necessity,
if this is admitted, be a copy of something.

Mow it is all-

important that the beginning of everything should be according
to nature.

And in speaking of the oopy and the original we

may assume that words are akin to the matter which they
describe; when they relate to the lasting and permanent and

Intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and,
as far as their nature allows,

nothlm? less.

irrefutable and immovable

But when they express only the cory or likeness

and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be

likely and analogous to the real words.

As being is to be-

7

coming, so is truth to belief"

The idea is the core of unchangeable reality which

underlies the surface qualities of perceptivity.

deny an idea without denying existence itself.

7>e

oannot

To say that

the ideas of goodness, justioe, being, etc., do not exist,
of
is to say that anything which possesses the qualities

7.

B. Jowett,

0£.

clt., Vol. II, p. 13-

(Timaeus)

7

goodness, Justice, being, etc., does not exist and possesses
no reality.

The idea transcends the world of concrete existence.
Its abiding place is apparently in the heavenly spheres and
yet this... "colorless and formless and intangible essence is
8

visible to the mind...".
It is the property of mind to interpret for us the world

of appearances.

Thus the function of mind is an exalted

function for it is the link which Joins us with the world of
reason and reality.

Were the mind inadequate to apprehend,

however dimly, these eternal essences, the way of man would
be the way of all unintelligible matter.

THE SOUL
Plato is concerned above all things with the soul.

It

is the

soul which elevates and enobles man above all living

things.

Plato's prime purpose throughout the Dialogues is

to be found in the repeated references and allusions to man's

He was oonsumpd with a desire to make the soul as

soul.

living and as vital a thought to others as it so patently was
to him.

Its real

The soul is immaterial, imperishable and real.

habitat is in the world of ideas and ideal forms.

This has

striking verification in the doctrine of recollection which

8.

B. Jowett,

op.

Pit ., Vol. I, p. 252.

(Fhagdrus)

.

8

in turn presupposes the doctrine of pre-existence.

It is

because of the essentially divine nature of the soul that we
are enabled from time to time to catch an intuitive glimpse
of the ideal world of truth.

The body, useful though it is

in this sensible existence, is nonetheless a distracting in-

fluence and likely to obscure, if one is not vigilant, the
real nature of truth.
"Is there not an absolute Justice?

Assuredly there is.
And an absolute beauty and absolute good?
Of coarse.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.
Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?

And

I

speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness,

and health, and strength, and of the essences of true nature
of everything.

Has the reality of them ever been perceived

by you through the bodily organs?

..

He attains to the \urest

knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone,...
who has got rid as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so
to speak, of the whole body,

these being in his opinion dis-

tracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her
9

from acquiring truth and knowledge"

9.

B. Jowett,

op_.

clt.

,

Vol. I, p. 449.

(Phaedo)

9

It is the soul which is the centre of knowledge and it
is the soul which is oontinually striring to achieve wisdom,

to recapture its former unclouded vision.

The soul is all

it is not only the animating source of life and movement of

the body

—but

it is a cosmic principle,

an intermediary be-

tween the eternal forms and the sensible world.
The soul, uncreated and changeless is a restless sojourner
in a world of change,

SUMMARY
Flato uses the two words mind and soul, indiscriminately.
Does this imply contradiction or confusion of thought?

It

is clearly not a matter of confusion so much as a denial of

any real distinction.

The soul shares the temporal experience of the body but
is not condemned as the latter is,

to ultimate dissolution.

The soul has that nexus with the world of reality which is

denied to the body.

Indeed, the soul is embarrassed to a very

greatextent by its physical ties.

Nonetheless, the soul is

able to overcome the barriers of sense and perceives reality.

Reality is not something which is inherent in any material
structure but rather is it discerned by a capacity of the
soul to aline with every object its ideal form.

The soul

confers intelligibility upon the object, not by reason of any

conscious effort, but because it is the soul's natural reaotion
so to do.

It is the instantaneous recall to memory,

for the

10

soul has once gazed upon the eternal forme and It recognizes
the material copies of the immaterial realities.

Throughout

its earthly sojourn, the soul is constantly involved in this

process of reminiscence.
It is only logical to suppose that if pre-existence is

one pole of the soul's circle of existence then immortality
is the other.

This is basic to Plato's thought and the

soul's captivity between pre-existence and the return to its
ideal realm is a form of punishment.

Plato believes that the

rational part of the soul alone is immortal for it is through

dialectic that truth is reached and the veil of perceptual
experience pierced.

Although it is possible for the mind to

be led astrsy by false data the innate nature of the soul is

beyond delusion.

It is one with reality.

ARISTOTLE
We are led from the study of Plato to that of Aristotle

whose ideas tended to dissipate some of the obscurity which
is implicit in much of the former's thinking.

Their methods

of reasoning were diametrically opposed in that the one

reasoned deductively from a priori principles while the other
claim
went far to establish the Inductive method, whioh came to
of
so unique a place for itself in the subsequent history

philosophies 1 speculation.

Aristotle sought to explain those principles of mental
translate
activity by which the mind could apprehend objects,

11

perceptions into Intelligible form and from thence to speculate concerning them.

His task was that of defining some

middle ground between the extremes of philosophical thought.
Protagoras, Empedocles and others were apparently emphatic
in their denial of absolute reality.

fixed standards of thought.

There could be no

Everything was dependent upon

perception and perception was a variable factor

tfhich could

never be accepted for adducing invariable principles.

Plato

on the other hand was concerned with a hypothetical world of

self-existent ideas which implied an external world of shadows

and unrealities.

SENSE PHENOMENA

Aristotle sought to find some way or some method which
would, within the scope of man's reason, be logically self

sustaining in its transition from the known to the unknown.
This meant for Aristotle a necessary belief in the reality
of sense phemomena, which Plato, as we have observed, refused
to entertain.

"Since according to common agreement there is nothing

outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial
magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms,
affecviz. both the abstract objects and all the states and

tions of sensible things.

Hence, no one can learn or under10

stand anything in the absence of sense.."
10.

Richard McKeon, editor, The Basic jorks of Aristotle,
Oxford translation. L" <?/ York: Random House,
p. 595.
(De Anima, Bk. Ill, Ch. 8.)
1941.

12

Aristotle accepted, experience as valid and rejected
the idealist theory simply on the grounds that it was not

proved and explained nothing.

By it we are afforded no knowl-

edge as to the origin of things and far from helping us to

understand existence, it robu us of what little we have and
reduces our evidences to shadows of the unknown.

The relation-

ship of mind to matter must begin with the acceptance of sense

experience, faulty though our conclusions may be.

We are

constrained to make use of such instruments as we have and
gain little by disparaging our primary means of contact with
reality.
*

The mind should occupy itself in attempting to

glean from objects as they appear, suoh information as it
can, rather than to think of them in terms of reference to

imaginary archetypes, the existence of which is one of conjecture.

Aristotle was concerned as to how far the dependence cf
mind upon body went.

He did not hesitate to reoogni'e that

such a dependency existed and yet he sought to establish the

separate and unique place of mind.

Perhaps this is where the

Platonic influence is most noticeable.

Aristotle conceived

of the soul as the entelechy of the body.

upon and superior to, the body.

It is both dependent

Knowledge is acquired through

experience and experience is conveyed through sensation.

It

is the concern of the body to derive from the Individual per-

ceived object its sensible qualities, while the mind is

concerned with the universal and intelligible form.

Although

.

13

sensation is relegated to a subordinate position, it in no
sense loses significance, for in the absence of these sensible

qualities there is no possibility of the soul's penetrating to
the quiddity or form, which is at the core of the perceived

object.

IMAGINATION AND MEMORY
What part does imagination and memory, so much a part of

mental activity, have to play in Aristotle's theory of mind?
The answer is that their place is subordinate rather than

primary.

Imagination is a kind of "inward sense" while memory

is the indistinct and lingering impression which is still re-

tained within the mind.
What then is the content of imagination?

Strictly speaking

it has no real content but is an extension of the senses re-

vealed to mind in the form of Imagery.
"When the mind is actively aware of anything, it is

necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are
11

like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter"

Aristotle is quick to joint out that imagination is a
direct consequence of the senses and does not exist apart from
them, nor does it involve any intellectual effort.
"It is clear then that imagination cannot, be (1) opinion

plus sensation, or (2) opinion mediated by sensation, or

11.

Richard McKeon, 0£. clt
Ch. 8.)

.

,

p.

595 (De Anlma, Bk. Ill,

Ik
(3)

a blend of opinion and sensation;
this

i

impossible both

,

for these reasons and because the content
of the supposed

opinion cannot be different from that or the
sensation: ... to
imagine is therefore identical with the thinking
of exactly
12
the srme as what one in the strictest sense
perceives".

Does it colour our thinking?

memory is "retained Impressions".

Yes of course it does, for
That is to say, when we

can trace an image back to its original impression
we have

memory.

The more compelling some past incident is, the more

reluctant is that impression to fade.

It lingers on as a sort

of guardian of our actions, easily recalled and prompting
the

mind to fear, delight and so on, as it recaptures the sense
experience of past acts.

It creates desire and appetite, and

anticipates the pleasant and the unpleasant.
We are, it seems, back again to our dependency upon the
senses.

Our thinking cannot be wholly free from sense ex-

perience either in the present, or from our past history.
"As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name

phantasia has been formed from phaos (light) because it is not
possible to see without light.

And because imaginations remain

in the organs of sense and resemble sensations

,

enimals in

their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e.

iche

brutes) because of the non-existence in them of mind, others
(i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in tnem of mind by

12.

Ibid., p. 588.

(De Anima, Bk. Ill, Ch.

3.)

.

15

13

feeling or disease or sleep"

INTELLEC T
The distinction between the senses and that part of
the soul that thinks and knows is stressed most emphatically
toy

Aristotle.

The sens=s deal with a world of concrete ob-

jects but the mind has for its content the abstract and the

We might ask the question, what is it (i.e. the

universal.
mind}?

The answer is that mind is not an entity but a pos-

sibility or capacity.
"If thinking is like rercelving, it must be either a

process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of

being thought, or a process different from but analogous to
that.

The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while

impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that
is, must be rotentlally identical in character with its ob-

ject.

Mine!

must be related to what is thinkable, as sense

is to what is sensible...

"It follows too, that like the sensitive part, it can

hsve no nature of its own other than that of having a certain
Thus that in the soul which is called mind is, be1^
fore It thinks, not actually any real thing".
capacity.

In other words the senses deal with potential knowledge

!3Ik.

Ibid

p.
Ibid., p.
.

,

«?89

590

(De Anima, Bk. Ill, Ch.
(De Anima, Bk. Ill, Ch.

3)

k)

16

while the intellect brin

s

it into actuality.

The intellect

is naturally dependent upon the senses for its information,

but having received such information it proceeds, by a process
of unfolding, to bring into existence, out of the potential

knowledge inherent in the sense data, the idea of intelligible
form.

It is this capacity for taking the potentially intel-

ligible and making it aotually intelligible which is the
crowning achievement of mind.
The intellect has a selective function and will exercise

this function commensurate with its degree of development.

Thus we can discern here the entrance of responsible choice.

Every mind performs the two processes of selection and evaluation but every mind does not arrive at the same conclusion.
The test of true knowledge then must be by some method of

reasoning which will eliminate error and determine whether or
no the selective and evaluative functions have led the thinker

into truth or fallacy.

It was to obviate the apparent hope-

lessness of uncertainty which impelled Aristotle to create for
our guidance the syllogistic method.

THE 3QUL

Aristotle was not able to accept Plato's world of separate
ideas and yet he conceded the reality of universal forms.

The

difference however, lay in the fact that forms had no existence
apart from matter.

The ideas of Flato were real and had a

completely separate and substantial existence.

The logical

17

conclusion with Plato was that the idea of the self must
imply an even greater degree of reality for the human soul.

Aristotle on the other hand considered the soul as being the
form of the body and apart from the body could not be thought
to exist.

Yet both Aristotle and Plato were in accord in observing
that the world of sense was indeed a world of change and it

wae necessary to go beyond this in order to reach the basic

reality of things.
Despite his emphasis upon the sensory nature of Knowing,

Aristotle was alive to the incorporeal nature of thought and
the distinctive qualities which separated thought and matter.

He was loth however, to relinquish his conviction that
the body and the soul were inseparably bound together.

If

this is true then how does it come about that thought can

transcend the limitations of space and timev

The soul, he

answers, has a number of different faculties and reason is
one of them.

Reason is both a metaphysical process and an organic one.
By reason, that which is potential in meaning beoomes actually
meaningful.

Eeason actualizes into consciousness the imma-

terial structure of things

— or

those thoughts and concepts

which make up the actuality of things.
If can

discern here an Aristotelian idealism which dif-

fers only in kind from that of Plato.

For he maintains that

behind all forms, all matter, is pure thought or pure actuality.

18

In this illuminative all pervading nous are the eternal

truths of things which makes up the intelligible structure of
the universe.
It is through the mind that man is able to apprehend

some of these truths.

In the vast realm of thought man has

the capacity of limited discernment.

Surely this alone would

give to the soul some superior position in relation to matter.
If it does, it can bring to us little satisfaction for the

mind itself is only that which is actualized.
of reason is immaterial and impersonal.

The substance

It floats into the

mind of man and departs from him with equal facility.
soul is not a thinking thing in its o\m right.

The

It is a

vehicle, an instrument, a means to an end.

SUMMARY
The mind according to Aristotle is superior to sense

knowledge but is dependent upon it.

The sensations come to

us as they are, neither variable nor delusive.

They impinge

upon the mind and unfold into ideas concerning them.

Because

of the capacity of mind to modify perception, these ideas

can differ according to the perceiver.

Imagination and memory

are extensions of the senses and differ only in so far as

imagination is sensory imagery and immediate, while memory is
the lingering impression of certain past sense experiences.

All thought is somewhat coloured by these activities.

Intellect takes potential knowledge inherent in sensations

19

and makes it actual.

It hae a double function in that it

acts selectively and according to itG ran^e of development

and it makes awareness possible.

Mind to Plato was a thing in itself but mind to Aristotle
is a temporal sharing in the eternal nous.

To the former,

the continued existence of personality was assured, to the

latter it is but a brief aspect of impersonal reality.

CHAPTER II

MEDIEVAL CONTRIBUTIONS

AUGUSTINE
Augustine's philosophy is not always readily disengaged
from his theology and religious beliefs.

Indeed, one is per-

suaded that he himself saw no reason why any real line of

demarcation should be drawn.

One writer suggests that Augustine

did not possess a didactic mind and found it difficult to think
15

in terms of scientific methodology.

Certainly he gave free

rein to his thinking irrespective of the conflicts incurred
in systematizing his philosophy.

KNOWLEDGE AND CERTITUDE
Augustine maintained that certainty could be attained by
the human mind.

This is possible despite the fact that the

results of Adam's sinning have been the dulling of our native
powers of reason.

It follows that the light of reason and

the acquiring of knowledge is revelatory.

that certitude is possible?

How do we know

We are led to this belief by

reason of our own assumption of the probability of truth.

If

there is no truth, there can be no probability of truth, which

15.
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is palpably false.

Moreover, whatever else may be called

In question, our own mental states are beyond the region of

doubt.

One may doubt the veracity of a given Judgment but

one cannot doubt that one is thinking.

By my doubts

I

prove

my existence.
His epistemology is demonstrated in this confidence in
the capacity of mind to attain true knowledge.

possible in two ways.
from the senses,

p^id

The latter is

First of all the mind derives its data
then, by reason of the divine element

within the mind, is able to discern with intelligence.

The

second method is for the mind to contemplate itself in retro-

For truth is indwelling within man in the form of

spection.

a divine element of understanding which goes beyond sense

perception.
M

Does it seem to you that material things, that is

R.

those appreciable by sense,

can be wholly apprehended by the

intellect?
A.

It does not.

R.

What then?

does it seem to you that God makes use

of the senses for the cognition of things?
A.

I

dare affirm nothing rashly concerning this point

but so far as

I

am permitted to conjecture, God in no way makes

use of senses.
We conclude then that consciousness is possible only
16
to the soul".
R.

16.

St. Augustine, The Soliloquies London:
& Co., "1910, Bfc. II, Sec. IV, p. 61.
,

Little, Brown
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We should "bear in mind that in the philosophy of

Augustine God is postulated as fundamentally necessary to
thought.

God is the source of truth and it is He who illumines

our minds, so that out of the material world of objectt, the

mind is able to comprehend.
The contemplation of one's own inner consciousness is

first to subjugate the body and then to mote

from a pure

introspective knowledge of oneself to the knowledge of higher
Augustine puts it as follows:

truth.
M

R.

What then, do you desire to know?
to know God and the soul.

A.

I desire

R.

And nothing more?
17

A.

Nothing whatever"

.

It is the light of God indwelling which is our standard

of ultimate and immutable values.

We rise therefore from the

contemplation of sensible objects to the inner contemplation
of our minds and hence to a certitude of knowledge through the

illumination of God.

ACTI VITIES OF THE SOUL

Augustine was not wholly uninfluenced by Plato, for whom
he had high regard, and he upholds the platonlc concept of

archetypal forms, with a difference.
"....the angel that brought God's word to Moses, being

17.

Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. II, p. 10.

.
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asked what his name was that bade him go free the Israelites
out of Egypt, answered his name was

am that

I

am:

thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel,

I

am hath sent

me to you*:

'I

and

as if in comparison of that which truly is, "being

Immutable the things that are mutable, are not

—a

truth which

18

Plato held strongly, and commended it highly"
God, according to Augustine, could never create irration-

Everything which was created, emerged from the divine

ally.

wisdom.
(i.e.

There must therefore, be a reason for all things,

in the mind of God) and it is this reason which is the

essence or archetype of the object.

These prototypes do not

have their locus in a separate intelligible world but only in
the wisdom of God.
It is the activities of the soul which enable man to

reach a knowledge of things.

Of these activities, that of

consciousness is paramount, for it functions, according to
Augustine, by a co-operative principle between the mind, the
senses, and God.

The potentially intelligible of Aristotle can become the

actually intelligible, only through the illumination of God.
Sensation is part of the soul's activity in the body.

Through sensation comes the sensible experience of the sensible
world which is the material of consciousness.

18.

The body is a

Everyman's
St. Augustine, The City of God, London:
Library, 19^7, Vol. I, Bk. VIII, Ch. XI, p. 235.
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vehicle for that material.

It la the soul however, which

permeates the whole of man and gives to him the consciousness
of being.
To attempt to define soul is hardly possible since it
is spiritual and immaterial and like truth cannot be defined

in terms of extension.

It is this same immaterial quality of

truth which Impels us to postulate its Imperishable nature.

augustine's belief is that God is the source of all knowledge.

The need for some standard of what la good, true and

beautiful is apparent if we are to make Judgments and determine
what is the contrary.

Such a standard must be immutable and

immanent, in a word, God.

The existence of God is, therefore,

the essential condition for the attainment of knowledge.

seek knowledge is to seek God.

To

One must first believe, in

order that one may know.

SUMMARY
Augustine makas a courageous admission of man

1

?

inability

to explain the transition from the mechanical to the illumina-

tive without bringing the presence of a third factor, God,
into his reckoning.

Certitude is possible but not from the senses alone.

The

senses are faulty and are handicapped by a heritage of human
sin.

Truth, however, Is part of the divine and may be intuited

by the mind, in the presence of sense experience, through the
light of understanding which is vouchsafed by God.
To Augustine the mind is the apprehending soul of man,

25

which having been created by God

is

functionally dependent

Undoubtedly the possibility of human error

upon its creator.

led Augustine to consider the fact of self-consciousness as
the most valid metaphysical assumrtion.

This

war,

beyond error

as it was both the evidence of self-existence and the revela-

tion of the divine creativity.

The mind to Augustine is conscious awareness and the
latter like the New Jerusnle-m i°

a

ift from God.

One may

analyse the rrocesses of reason to some profit but the simple
•ct of "knowing"

ST.

is the supreme mystery.

THOMAS /&TJIKA9
The epietemology of St. Thomas is bound

Aristotelian method.

ttj

with a revival of

He was explicit in his belief that all

knowledge begins with sense knowledge.

It is from this latter

sense knowledge that we are enabled to arrive at intellectual

knowledge.

Unlike the idealist rosition, he believed that we

first rerceive, not the mental process from within us, but
the Immediate experience of the external world.

MIND AND 30UL
Mind, according to Aquinas, is the highest function of
the soul.

It is the capacity which enables the soul to grasp

of
and to unite in an intelligible way the formal structure

objects, with the objects themselves.
of God,

These forms, or ideas

abstrac
are inseparable from their objects but can be

.

by the active intellect.
The beginning of knowledge is sense perception.

Sensa-

tion however, is not knowledge until it is responded to by

consciousness.

It is this latter active phase which trans-

forms sensation into knowledge.

Nothing is added to the sense

image but its stimulus brings to light the intelligibility

This capacity of the mind to separate, select

of the object.

and form judgments is the process of understanding.

The im-

pressions or forms of the objects which the mind receives are
not identical with the objects themselves but are only such

elements of thought as are necessary for the mind to know.
The ability of the mind to do this is inherent in the fact
that mind is but another faculty of the soul.
"The agent intellect .... is something in the soul.

In

order to make this evident, ye must observe that above the

intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the powers of under19
8 tanning"

Not only are we to suppose that the intellect derives
its power of understanding from God but we are also led to

believe that its power to comprehend incorporeal things is
evidence of its own incorporeal nature.

Aquinas does not streps the superiority of the soul over

body to the point where one might regard the latter as a mere
19.

Summa Theologi And, Summa Contra
New Xork: The Modern Library, 19^8. H. 79,

9t. Thomas Aquinas,

Gentiles

,

A. Wt pg. 3*A.

-

.

7

instrument.

On the contrary, the soul is the form of the

body, and is incomplete without the bodily senses as a neces-

sary aid to intellectual knowledge.
Zf the knowledge so acquired reliable?

that much of it

is.

Aquinas says

But it is laboriously attained be-

truth.

cause man's vision of truth is only partial and is intermittent.

In this respect we are made cognizant of man's status

as lower than that of the divine intellect.

"The human intellect must of necessity understand by

composition and division.

For since the intellect passes from

potentiality to act, it has a likeness to generable things,
which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it
by degrees.

In the same way, the human intellect does not

acquire rerfect knowledge of a thing by the first apprehension;

but it first apprehends something of the thing, such as its
quiddity, which is the first and proper object of the intellect; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and

various dispositions affecting the essence.

Thus it necessar-

ily relates one thing with another by composition or division;

and from one composition and division it necessarily proceeds
to another, and this is

'reasoning'

"But the angelic and the divine intellects, like all

incorruptible beings, have their perfection at once from the
beginning.
°

Hence the angelic and divine intellect have the

entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly..."
20.

Ibid., %« 85, A. 5, P.
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The intellect we observe transoends the sensible world

only as it accompanies it and is dependent upon its data.

It

is this dependency which leads Aquinas to postulate some way

of obviating the seeming indignity Imposed upon a spiritually

superior power.

The body, a material and perishable organ,

could not be found acceptable as dictator of the knowing and
immaterial spirituality of the mind.
It is he

e

then, where the innate superiority of the soul

comes into its own.

God is the source of all truth and not

only does He enable us to acquire knowledge indirectly through

sensory perception but He also conveys knowledge directly

.

Knowledge according to Aquinas may be either natural or revealed.

The domain of faith is certainly distinct from that of

reason but it does not contradict reason.

On the contrary,

it both strengthens and supplements it.

We are introduced into a realm of truth which is beyond
our powers of sensory experience to take us.

Knowable truth

is enlarged by revelation which takes us beyond the llmitai

tions of human reason into a new kind of knowledge.

SUMMARY
The facts of consciousne fs teach us that the soul and
the body are substantially united while the nature of thought

leads us to infer the immateriality and immortality of the
soul.

Soul and body are co-principles in one unit and neither
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is complete without the other.
St. Thomas does not depart from the Aristotelian point

of view sgve when he finds himself forced to do so.

The

mind is Indeed functional but it can rise above its temporal
limitations and attain to a more direct knowledge than that

afforded by the senses.

It is the soul which makes man a

rational being and it is by reason of the immaterial nature
of thought that the subordinate status of the body is inferred.

Moreover, the body is destroyed with the loss of the form

which gives it being.
is incorruptible.

The oonverse is not true for the form

It is independent of the body in the

highest reaches of thought.
stroys the soul.

Death perfects rather than de-

We are now led to believe that if the soul

can rise superior to the rhysical limitations of the body,

then it can in no wise be the product of material forces.

Matter cannot produce immaterial effects.

The soul therefore

was created and is the radical principle of all vital functions
(primum principium vitae.).

Thus, St. Thomas grounds his

philosophy in his theology.

God created the soul for the

body and the latter is vitalized by its presence.

But the

soul is ever seeking perfection through knovrledge and virtue

until death separates the soul from matter.
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CHAPTER III

MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES

RENE DESCARTES
Descartes does much to establish confidence in the unique
nature of mind.

His heretical method of doing this is per-

haps rather devastating to philosophical progress but cer-

tainly it arrests attention and forces one to re-examine the

validity of his beliefs.

Descartes begins by discountenancing

all claims to truth other than those which are so clearly and

distinctly perceived as to be self-evident.

All else, however,

must be rigorously analysed and submitted to a dialectic of

methodically reasoned enquiry.

CERTAINTY AND DOUBT
It was necessary to establish the validity of some

There must be some un-

premise which would be beyond doubt.

equlvocably acceptable truth which would be the pre-supposltion
of all knowledge.

The finding of such an incontrovertible

truth was fundamentally necessary as the starting place for
the acquisition of scientific knowledge.

Descartes here takes up the Augustinian argument of the
subjective certainty of the knowing self.

validity of the external world, it may be
question the reality of objects, but

I

I

may doubt the

a dream,

and I may

cannot doubt that the

dream is mine or that I apprehend the objects.

I cannot doubt

.

31

that
I

I

am a thinking conscious being. (Cogito , ergo sum.).
.

cannot doubt my capacity to think, though my conclusions

may be open to question.
"This alone is inseparable from me.
is certain; but how often?
it would even happen,
I

I am

—I

exist; this

As often as I think; for perhaps

if I should -wholly cease to think,

should at the same time altogether cease to be.

mit nothing that is not necessarily true:

I

I

that

now ad-

am therefore,

precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind,
understanding, or reason,
fore unknown to me.

— terms

whose signification was be-

I am, however,

a real thing,

and really

21

existent.

.
.

"

So it is,

that, from the basis of the mind's ability to

apprehend its own existence, all subsequent knowledge is
derived.
*

CARTESIAN DUALISM
Descartes proceeds to establish the antithetical nature
of mind and matter.

He has intimated that the nature of mind

conis that which thinks, and, by so doing has demonstrated

sciousness as an immaterial substance.

What of the external

world of material things which we so clearly perceive?

Can

a world is conveyed to our minds via sense jhenomena.

The answer is both

we doubt the evidence of these phenomena?

21.
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ye« and no.

The senses record such perceptual information as colour,
sound,

shape, texture and so on, and these are real qualities.

It is only when we choose to go beyond our certain knowledge
of extension that we are likely to draw false conclusions.

Whenever we depart from those certainties of extension which
have been vouohaafed to us, the responsibility is ours entirely.
That extension is real, there is no doubt, for geometry

which depend* upon extension for its data, remains the clearest of all sciences.

The fact remains however, that we do

fall into error and this is due to our will which tends to

form Judgments from inadequate knowledge.
*.But

now since we know that all our errors depend upon

our will, and as no one wishes to deceive himself, it may
• *en»

wonderful that there is any error in our Judgments at all.

It is necessary to remark, however, that there is a great

difference between willing to be deceived, and willing to
yield assent to opinions in which it is found that error is
22
found"
Apart from this will to err, we are confronted, according to Descartes by a distinct dichotomy of mind and matter.

There is a gulf between the essential nature of mind, which
is thoug-ht, and the essential nature of matter, whioh is ex-

tension.

22.

Mind and matter are antithetical and as created

ftene Descartes,

oj).

clt., p. 181.

33

substances exist independently.
"I do not observe that aught necessarily belongs to my

nature or essence beyond

ray

being a thinking thing, or a

substance whose whole essence or nature is merely thinking,
and although I may,
I

or rather, as I will shortly say, although

certainly do possess a body with which

I

am very closely

conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a
clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as

I

am only a

thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand,

I

possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an
extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that

X,

that is,

am what I am, is entirely and truly dis23
M
tlnct from my body, and may exist without it

my mind, by which

I

.

Descartes has herein established a dualism which ever
since has vexed the minds of philosophers.

SUMMARY
Descartes believed mind to be a capacity of the soul.
It was because of a mechanical union that some measure of

accord was established between the soul and the body, that
is, between thought and extension,

two antithetical substances

otherwise incompatible.
His primary search was to establish some valid form of
truth.

23.

This he believed to reside in his own intuited knowledge

Rene Descartes,

op_.

clt

.

,

p.

132.
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of personal existence.

His belief in God as absolute perfection was founded
upon
the supposition that the idea of perfect Being implied
the

existence of such a Being.

It is obvious that perfection is

not to be found within any finite thing and yet its concep-

tion is within us.

Its cause, therefore, must lie outside

ourselves.

Descartes rests the reliability of thought upon the re-

liability of the perfect nature of God.

For since the per-

fection of God involves His veracity, it is impossible that
He could so have created us as to contribute to our deception.
We can depend upon our cognitive faculties because we can

depend upon the nature of God.
Descartes however, still leaves his meaning none too
clear.

How are we to bridge the gulf between the two worlds,

corporeal and incorporeal?

DAVID HUME
Descartes created a problem which subsequent philosophers
have endeavored to resolve.

The materialists have reduced

mind to matter while the idealists have made matter into mind.
Hume's approach to the Cartesian dualism was unequivocal.

He

maintained that it could not be rationally Justified.
Hume adopted the attitude that apart from the contents of
mind we could assume nothing.

concrete object, then

I

If

I

perceive some individual

apprehend its reality through sensation

.
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and apart from this sensation (or series
of sensations) I
have no other grounds for belief in the
objectivity of the
thing in question. If it were possible for
one to take in-

ventory of the mind's oontents we should probably
find that
the result of such analysis would disclose the
presence
of

sundry perceptions, the aggregate of which produces
a con-

tinuum of consciousness.
"The only existences, of which we are certain, are per-

ceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness,

command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of
2k
all our conclusions"

How do we obtain these perceptions and how much reality
do they possess.

Hume seems to assume objective reality even

though he tends to confuse one by the subjective nature of
his deductions.

THE NATURE OF PERCEPTIONS
The mind is a locus of impressions and ideas and these
are to Hume the constituents of consciousness.

Apparently

our impressions vary a good deal in intensity and relevance.

Those which most effectively influence us are significant for
their greater degree of liveliness.
"...we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into
two classes or species, which are distinguished by their

2k.

David Hume, Ari E nquiry Conc e rning Human Understand ing .and^
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different degrees of force and vivacity.

The less forcible

and lively are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas.
other.

.

.Impressions

.

By the term Impression, then.

I

The

mean

25

all our more lively perceptions."

What is herein meant by thinking?
The capacity to think Is seemingly the ability to recall
and re-arrange in a selective pattern, earlier ideas and to

Hume describes the mind as,

do this at will.

"a kind of theatre, where several perceptions

successively

nrnke

their appearance; pass, repass, glide away,
26

and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations".
27

..."a heap or collection of different perceptions".
The substantiality of the mind can no longer be affirmed

for every faculty of the mind which has occasioned man to

compliment himself is razed to the ground.

All his knowledge

and beliefs are fundamentally reducible to perceptions and
the simple structure of their relationships.

Han cannot ex-

ceed the bounds of his own nature, even his most imaginative

and abstract efforts are thus simply defined.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND 9ELF- C0N3C IOU SNE33
..."when
I

I

enter most intimately into what

I

call myself

,

always stumble on some particular perception or other, of

pleasure.
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or
25.
26.
27.

David Hume, 0£. clt
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I

can never catch myaelf at any time without a perception,

and never can observe anything but the perception.

..

.If any

one upon serious and unprejudiced reflexion, thinks he has
a

different notion of himself

...All I can allow him is,

.

that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are
28

essentially different in this particular.

..

w

The whole process of Ideation is one of successive images, or

perceptions.

Consciousness is never consciousness of self

but of related perceptions and even the belief in coherent

relationship cannot be justified.
Hume saw no valid reason for supposing a necessary re-

lationship of causation, without which we could not have
coherence, save on the basis of experience alone.

Yet ger-

mane to all Intelligent thought is the property of coherence.
The reason for this, according to Hume, is because of a
•flowing' process, in which any series of perceptions, are

related to each other by resemblance and oontiguity.

It is

this stream of resemblances which creates the illusion of

constancy and coherence making for consciousness.
The inner world of the

1

self * oan tell us nothing of it-

self for as an entity it does not exist.

What then can be said of objective reality?

Very little,

for its substantial nsture is lost in its reduction to per-

ceptions and the continued existence of any object is problematic.

28.

Vrtiat

we actually hsve is a stream of rapid perceptions

David Hume, op . clt
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p.

246.
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which, though not Identical, bear such close resemblance to

each other as to create the illusion of both fixed existence

and coherent connection.

This pan-phenomenalism allows us

little within the context of consciousness save our perceptions and these are suspect.

SUMMARY
David Hume has reasoned that the nature of mind is merely
its contents, that is, it is impernanent and dependent upon

sense phenomena.

The process of Ideation is but a suooession

of different perceptions related and cemented together by

their resemblances to each other.

The mind or consciousness

is the sum of its Impressions and is so conditioned to expect

a "cause and effect" procedure that the necessity of such an

order is th* basic structure of thought.

It is this same

inner necessity which Impels us to confer upon the external

world oonstant identity within the framework of an ordered
pattern.

Hume has reduced mind to its contents and has then analysed
its oontents.

The mind is able to view the world as it does

because of a fixed mode of behavior.

It has certain presupposi-

tions of beliefs which govern all mental prooesses.

Externality

is one such belief and necessary connection is another.

Upon

>

these hinge

the nature of thought.

Just as philosophers have accepted the principle that we
can h ve no idea of external substance, distinct from the

ideas of particular qualities, so also in regard to mind, we
can have no notion of it, distinct from particular perceptions.
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HENRI BERGSON
Henri Bergson, whose treatment of the Heraclitean dictum

"everything changes", has done much to stimulate contemporary
philosophy, begins by denying the ability of mechanistic

philosophy to define mind adequately.

The proponents of such

philosophy have failed to prove that the psychical is deter-

mined by the physical.

True they have described how, but they

have not been able to prove how, nor have their explanations
been entirely satisfactory.

David Hume himself, whose efforts were at least as thorough
as most,

expressed himself as far from satisfied with his
29

explanations.

Bergson was emphatic in his belief that consciousness
and the physical functions of the brain were not identical.

Undoubtedly there is a distinct relationship

,

but Just what

the nature of this relationship is, has not yet been established.

An analysis of consciousness indicates that the conception
of mind as a stream of conscious states is no longer tenable.

These states of consciousness are themselve- continually

undergoing change, and our conception of constancy must be
reoonsidered.

We are in a never ceasing process of change.

We are indeed, change itself.

Herein then is a condition

wherein we cannot say that anything changes because outside of
change there is no category of description.
Nonetheless, we do discern by the intellect a seemingly
static and dependable world.

This is both the evidence of

our senses and the basis of our intellectual concepts.
29.
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Reality

^0
is represented, to us as a oonstant.

It is obvious then, that

something ll wrong somewhere, for we are being presented with
a world of constancy which actually does not exist as such.

UTILITARIAN NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
We gain our knowledge of things through experience and
The mind

we accept as real only the evidence of experience.

Is a storehouse of such experiences and its function is to

feed into consciousness those values of past experience which
can usefully serve the present situation.

"Thus is ensured the appropriate reaction, the correspond-

ence to environment

— adaptation,

general aim of life.

in a word

—which

is the

And a living being which did nothing

but live would need no more than this.

But, simultaneously

with this process of perception and adaptation which ends in
the record of the past in the form of motor habits, conscious-

ness, as we have seen, retains the image of the situations

through which it has successively travelled, and lays them
side by side in the order in which they took place.

us* are these memory-images?

Of what

Preserved in the memory, re-

produced in consciousness, do they not distort the practical

character of life,
consciousness.

. .

They would, no doubt, if our actual

.did not set aside all those among the vast

images which cannot be co-ordinated with the present per30

ception and are unable to form with it a useful combination".
Thus apparently is man able to survive and make progress
in a highly developed behavior pattern.
30.
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of memory and experience which is the consciousness
of man.
It is a vital part of the adaptation of the
species to
environment. What of our ideas? These too can be
similarly

accounted for.

Ideas arise when memory and perception commingle

and emerge as a constructively useful form of concept.

The

purpose of whioh is practically motivated.

INTELLECT AND INTUITION
The purpose of intelleotion is one which has its roots
in the soil of useful necessity and it is shaped by
the

categories in which it works,

"...intelligence is the faculty of constructing unorgan-

ized—that

is to say

artificial— instruments

.

If,

on its

account, nature gives up endowing the living being with the

instruments that may serve him, it is in order that the
living being may be able to vary his construction according
31
to circumstance..".

Intellection is a faculty whose primary purpose is that
of achieving enos and these ends are the satisfactions of

the organism.
It is at best a faulty instrument.

Does it not present

to us a world of static and dependable qualities when the

truth is that the universe is a continuous flow?

However necessary it may be for us to live In a stable
world, we cannot allow the utilitarian tendency of intellect
to obnoure the true nature of reality.

Behind the eternal and continuing change of things is a
31.

Henry Bergson, Creative Evolution
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powerful upward surge-elan vltal~a creative
and vital force,
in whioh we share and of which we are
a part.
This dynamic
urge Is inherently a part of the whole
universal
structure.

We see it in the constant change of nature—
the emergence of
new forms and the bewildering diversity of
:ife.

Whvt does this notion of Bergson imply?

It carries with

it a teleological significance and the implication
of mind
in a major context.

Although he detracts from the human mind

any real value as an entity, he infers from the ebulliency
of
nature an idealistic and purposive vitality.

The role of the

human mind is to Bergson a minor one in the great drama.

It

is but an Incident in the workings of the creative urge.

It Is by intuition alone that we transcend our own

natures.

What then does he mean by intuition?

It is the

direct and immediate apprehension of knowledge, which the
intellect, of itself, cannot achieve.

It is through intuition,

which has a divining sympathy with reality, that we are able
to penetrate to the essence of things.

Bergson believes that

intuition completes, rather than overthrows, intellect.

It

is by intuition that we are able to discern this vital im-

pulse which permits nothing to be, save that which is change.

SUMMARY

Bergson defines mind as that which is useful to the
organism in the constant challenge of environment.
world of chan

e

In this

it is the function of mind to give to the

organism a sense of dependability, to fuse the endless change
of things into an apparently stable form.

Mind is a means

*3
to an end and the end is the life of the organism.

Can this be the whole story of mind, a purely physical
function and a fallacious witness as to the true nature of
things?

Bergson, however, having shown the limitations of

mind, resorts to intuition.
of the mind?

But is not intuition a function

True it may be regarded as an involuntary

activity but if Bergson is right then intuition Is the highest

function of the mind and superior to conceptual ability.

Is

true mind that which serves the organism or that which brings
us into touch with reality?
It is not the intellect whioh enables us to reach the

heart of experience for the latter is falsified by the intellect.

We intuit the reality of experience from within

and not from without.

True mind is not that which serves

the organism in its efforts to survive but that which inter-

prets the true meaning of the efforts involved.

.

CHAPTER IV

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

REALISM
"Realism holds that things known may continue to
exist

unaltered when they are not known, or that things may
pass in
and out of the cognitive relation without rrejudice
to their

reality, or that the exist nee of a thing is not correlated
with or dependent upon the fact that anybody experiences
it,

perceives it, conceives it, or is in any way aware of it".

32

Hence realism confines much of its study to the establishing of the reality of externality.

It ascribes reality to

more than the tangible, concrete evidences of our senses, but
goes further and ascribes reality also to values of Judgment,
the universal forms of our thinking becoming "subsistent

entities"

Can realism help us in our study of mind Itself?

We may

establish to our satisfaction the reality of the objective

world around us, but what of the mind by which it is apprehended?
In realism we face a doctrine of pluralism which not

only separates mind from matter fairly conclusively but which

32.
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also separates universale, physical laws, mathematical constants and moral values.

All are individual levels of "being,

for the objective world is real, the conscious apprehending

mind is real and the experience itself wherein the conscious
mind and the objective world interact is real also.

According to Bertrand Russell, reality

is one in essence

The world of reality is

but pluralistic in manifestation.

made up of neutral stuff which is arranged in differing com-

binations of reality.

In one form it is matter, in another

it is mind.

Modern science has proved rather conclusively that matter
is not a stable element at all and psychology has also demon-

strated that mind does not have the substantial quality which
was once assumed for it.

Matter and mind are merely derivatives

from some oommon source stuff, or as Russell calls it "relative

particulars"
It is the apparent fluidity of these particulars which

not only creates objective reality but is responsible also for

mental states.
"Physics and psychology are not distinguished by their

material.

Mind and matter are logical constructions; the

particulars out of which are constructed, or from which they
studied
are inferred, have various relations, some of which are
33
by physics, others by psychology"
.

33.
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We are left with a definition of mind which robs it of

any peculiar distinction, save in a purely functional sense-

certainly not in regard to status or quality.

The mind can

lay no claim to superior status in the universe.

It is but

an aspect of the constant flux of reality at work within

"logically ordered systems".

The conscious mind exercises

a function which is neither transcendental nor supernatural

for it has its place within the economy of nature like any

other function.

It is a presumptuous suggestion that con-

sciousness is confined exclusively to the human mind.

Con-

sciousness pervades nature in a much wider sense than is

commonly understood.

It is a matter of definition.

It is

moreover, the task of the naturalist or the empiricist to

explore this consciousness and to determine the conditions
under which it works.
It seems that although most realists are prepared to

recognize the human mind as an aspect of reality, they do
little to enhance its prestige.

The realist says, in a word,

that human awareness is a mode of consciousness, nothing is

determined by mind, for mind is only part of the scheme of
things

— or

in case scheme implies a sch-mer,

object to such an implication

— the

and to those who

order of things.

Yet

mind does appear to be extant in the universe and is an in-

credibly wondrous thing.

Its place and purpose in the universe

is surely moet inadequately explained by a doctrine, which,

while admitting its reality, denies its pre-eminence.

a

hi

Even if the laws of mind are as fixed and determined as
are the lews of growth which govern the growth of a cabbage,
the fqct remains that the mind knows that it exists, and it

knows that the cabbage exists.

It is hardly likely that the

reverse is true.
However, not all realists are committed to determinism
nor inde°d are they all in sympathy with the neo-realism of

Bertrend Russell.
The realist knows that he is real and one must suppose
that he is prepared to accent the reality of other minds also.

This supposition alone opens up an interesting field of enquiry.

Where there is a multitude of minds there must

certainly be as many aspects of reality.

Each mind differ

and agrees in many particulars with all the other minds.

It

is not too difficult to appreciate the divergencies of thought.

The«e can be readily understood on purely arbitrary grounds.
But what of the measure of agreement, how did it arise?
"we

are here close to an understanding of the realism of

Plato in his world of ideas.

For it is a necessary postulate

of thought to in^er an even greater reality beyond, if only
to account for those agreements which allow many minds to

converge along a common highway.
The dominant disagreement among the ranks of the realists

who are opposed to this view is probably due to an over

confident belief in natural laws.

The world is to them a

material system det-rmined by rhysical laws and mind is not

.
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above but within the range of these laws.

whatever of

seeming superiority mind claims for itself, at best it can
only be taken for granted.

However plausible this may be,

one should not overlook the fact that the absolute rejection

of all possible reality outside the limits of finltude is

indefensible.

It is an example of dogmatism which is equally

guilty of trespassing beyond the boundaries of human knowledge.

It is not possible to arrive at a conception of mind

which would remain true for all realists.
front on this matter.

There is no united

To the skeptical realist, mind is a

phenomenon which needs no special reference.

To the theistic

realist, mind in an evidence of a more complete reality beyond
our knowledge.
of unity

— mind

To both skeptic and theist there is one bond
is real.

The realist recognizes values, laws, moral and ethical

compulsions, as realities-— the skeletal structure of human
life and conduct, but the cognition of such does not confer

ujon the knower any perpetuating quality.

We have a record

of what the mind does end have no reason to suppose that what
it

i_s,

is of any more significance than that of any other

phenomenon of nature
To the realist mind is a process,

that it is any more

than this, hes not yet been established.

2^9

INSTRUMEWTALI3M

John Dewey Is perhaps the most vigorous proponent of
Instrumentallsm and sets forth the tenets of that philosophical approach most suitably for our purpose.

The human mind possesses for John Dewey no unique
significance.

It is a highly organized and acutely developed

organ whose chief purpose is to link up experiences in specific
ways.

The mind has the task of instrumentally connecting one

experience to another and creating a coherence out of a series
of experiences.

The mind then, is a responsive agent whose function is

only valid as long as it deals with specific events.

The

evolutionary ascent of man has demonstrated the paramount

necessity for adaptation, or responsiveness to environment.
In this way the more organized brain of the higher animals

has enabled the survival of the fittest to become the law
of nature.

The fittest does not imply the most worthy to live in
a moral sense, but the most capable of adaptation and of re-

sponsive behavior to fear, danger, and changed situations.
All this demanded not reflective powers but responsive powers.

Specif io situations calling up specific reactions.
Thus, according to Dewey, the true and primary function
of mind is not reflection, which can conjure false situations

and lead to false Judgments, but it is an instrument of re-

lationship, moving from one experience to another.

.
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The inner life is primarily concerned with the imjulse
or desire of the organism and only secondarily with
thought
or reason.

The basic purpose of thought is that it might

further the organism in its attempt to realize its desires.
The Impulse provides the motive power when desire is centered

around an object and gives rise to action in a particular way.
The essence of such a doctrine it found in the words

commonly associated with Instrumentallsm, "To know, is to know

how to do"
The mind has been reduced to a biological phenomenon

whose duties are prosaic and mundane.

We will examine this

more fully in the light of Dewey's further considerations.

A DEFINITION OF MIND
According to Dewey, philosophers have made the grave
mistake of creating a false dichotomy of mind and body.

Yet,

there is no real separation possible for mind is a natural

outcome of a highly developed physical organism, an organism

which has evolved over an incredibly long period of time,
amidst a variety of environmental challenges.

It is disastrous

to thought to try to separate the various activities of body

and mind.

It creates a problem which inhibits any possibility

of attaining a true picture of things.

Mind and body should

not be divorced from each other for they are one, and as one,

express themselves in action.
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"xhen we take the standpoint of action we may

a till

treat

some functions as primarily physical and others as primarily

mental.

Thus we think of,

say, digestion, reproduction and

locomotion as conspicuously physical, while thinking, desiring,
hoping, loving, fearing are distinctively mental.

Yet if we

are wise we shall not regard the difference as other than one
of degree and emphasis.

If we go beyond this point and draw

a sharp line between them, consigning one set to body exclusively

and the other to mind exclusively we are at once confronted by

undeniable facts.

The being who eats and digests is also the

one who at the same time is sorrowing and rejoicing; and it
is a commonplace that he eats and digests in one way to one

effect when glad, and in another when he is sad.
also

Eating is

social act and the emotional temper of the festal board

a

enters Into the alleged merely physical function of digestion

What the facts testify to is not en influence exercised
across and between two separate things, but to behaviour so

Integrated that it is artificial to split it up into two
things 0

.

Thus Dewey asserts that body and mind are not two distinct

entities seeking to influence each other, but two integrated
rarts of one whole, united in the common function of living.
It is true that our knowledge of psychological processes has

3^.

Joseph Ratner, editor, The Philosophy of John Dewe£,
New York: Henry Holt &~"<To. 1928, p. 73.
,
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demonstrated that the body is not wholly free from mental
states nor mental states from bodily conditions.

Mind is a

psycho-physical phenomenon, not to be despised because of it,
but to be appreciated as such.

All our attempts to separate

mind and body are misguided and spring from our unhappy dis-

position to see things as separate parts and functions instead
of as operative wholes.

It is the amazing fitness of many

parts and functions into intricate wholes which is the puzzle
and delight of nature.

Each part fits Into the life of its

neighbour and each is dependent and Instrumental in the life
of the other.

The whole is a process and the function of each

object, animate or Inanimate, is its part within that process.

The body-mind relationship is an example of this interlocking

order of nature.
"The world seems mad in pre-occupatlon with what is

specific, particular, disconnected in medicine, politics,
science, industry, education.
of inclusive wholes,

In terms of a conscious control

search for those links which occupy key

positions and which effect critical connections is indispensable.

But recovery of sanity depends upon seeing and using

these specifiable things as links functionally significant in
a process.

To see the organism in nature, the nervous system

in the organism,

the brain in the nervous system, the cortex

in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt

philosophy.

And when thus seen they will be seen to be

_in,
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not as marbles are In a box but as events are in history,
in a moving, growing, never finished process".

35

CONSCIOUSNESS
Can we attain to some definition of consciousness which
will enable us to see mind as something more than an adjunct
to physioal life?

Dewey seems to imply that we can.

Conscious-

ness as differentiated from the totality of mental experiences

which we call mind, is the locus of attention in any given
moment.

"Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are

embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a

being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings,
it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contem-

porary or future,
ideas.

their meanings, the having of actual

JLn

The greater part of mind is only implicit in any

conscious act or state; the field of mind

— of

operative

meanings— is enormously wider than that of consciousness.
Mind Is contextual and persistent; consciousness is
focal and transitive.

..

.Mind is a constant luminosity;
36

consciousness intermittent

1

'.

We observe that consciousness is not mind as such, save
in a limited and focal sense.

35.
36.

Joseph Ratner,
Ibid., i. 303.
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For mind is discursive and
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has for its content the wide hidden backgrounds of once

conscious states.

Consciousness however, is like a spot-light

which illumines where it falls

ana"

leaves its surrounds, not

entirely erased, but submerged in the shadows.
But what of this illumination?

It is the easiest thing

in the itforld to describe the fact of awareness without explain-

ing

thing.

3

Dewey i3 aware of this anomaly and he seeks to

find something to say about it which will help to elucidate his
problem.

He asserts that the nervous system has been tracked

down to the cortex of the brain but eo far it has not been

possible to say which part of the cortex is the seat of consciousness.

But, he

v

T

arns, we should beware lest we forget

to think in terms of whole results rather than in specific

parts.

The problem he avers is no problem at all when viewed

in this overall perspective.

It is like trying to explain a

piece from a Jig-saw puzzle, which, when seen as a whole,
needs no such explanation.
One oannot help but feel

much with ua.

th=it

the problem is still very

It has been frequently said by Instrumentalists

that consciousness has been exaggerated out of all proportion
to its real place and significance in the life of the organism.

There is enough truth in this for it to warrant consideration.

Undoubtedly we tend to overlook the fact that life is
lived, not in the fleeting moment arlness of consciousness, but
as a result of the many psycho-physical processes which are

going on all the time and of which we are not conscious.

We
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have only to think of growth, digestion, breathing, and the

many involuntary acts of the body to realize the extremely

complex nature of life, a very small part of which enters into
consciousness.

The instrumentalist is here faced with an

unavoidable dilemma.

If the conscious mind has evolved in

such a way as to facilitate the aims of the organism, what of
the hidden processes of life which account for so much and
yet are without conscious motive?

We have a very strong case for unconscious motivation as
a power which is apparently responsible to a large extent for

what we are and even for our survival.
It is perfectly patent that this unconscious motivation

has ends after which it strives and it Is equally plain that
it achieves these ends with amazing success.

We need but to widen our concept a little to se- quite

readily the working of such an unconscious motivation behind
the whole order of nature.

Even our conscious awareness is

accompanied by the unconscious and lightning play of many
physiological functions.
The instrumentalist does not convince when he asserts
that mind is only a means of facilitating ends.

He Implies

that the end of the organism needs to be known.

In most oases

the ends are not known, they are simply achieved.

If nature

can get along very well without consciousness and obviously

does so, then out of what necessity did consciousness emerge
and what are the specific ends which demand that the object

56

sought shall be known?

Mind as a means to an and is not herein repudiated as
an unworthy purpose but rather does it indicate that our

sights should be raised to cover those ends which lie outside
the range of the unconscious.

The unconscious mind, which

governs most of our living has for its purpose the survival
of the organism and the satisfaction of its desires, but the

conscious mind has a far higher purpose to achieve.

It la a

purpose which will make for the moral and spiritual maturity
of man, and this is the essential property of consciousness.

IDEALISM
Idealism has its emphasis upon the absolute nature of
mind and in some Instances has gone so far as to reject the

reality of all existence apart from the knower.

This is not

entirely true of the objective form of idealism which does
at least posit the existence of objects outside of the human

mind

— existent

in the mind of God.

Consciousness, according to the Idealist, is the most

important problem which the philosopher has to encounter.
It is fundamental to an understanding of both the knower and

the known.

The problem is a unique one in that consciousness

Is both subject and objeot at the same time.

It is this capacity however,

to indulge in such a re-

markable feat, according to Josiah Royce, which leads us to

believe that the infinite must be a person.

He assuredly cannot

.
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be less than we ourselves.

Through the finite we are able to discern him imperfectly
and our difficulty becomes acute when we try to describe him
in terms of personality

— terms

which are essentially human,

"What is a person?", is not easily answered, for although
we may feel very sure of our knowledge in this respect it is

not easy to define adequately.

We Invariably begin by en-

larging those virtues and those values which we ourselves

possess in a more limited degree and positing their absolutes
in the person of God.

Hence we arrive at a super-personality, measurable and

partially understood to our finite minds.
"In seeking after God, there are many who do indeed begin

by asking the question, "Who am I?* but who thence proceed by
offering some facile answer, such as the well-known one, "I
am a thinking substance/ or the still more familiar one, "I
am a being possessed of free choice and volition," and on

such a basis a theology is quickly built up.

This theology

will therefore, indeed, take a comparatively naive shape.

I

37

am a person.

God,

of course,

is another".

We are thus oompelled to go beyond the definitive powers
of our own naivete.

He,

that is the idealist, aware only of

his own fragment of self -consciousness declines to state a

priori his ideas of personality in philosophical terms.

37.
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How then do wt attain to knowledge?

Must we not begin

by recognising the fragmentary nature of consciousness as we
experience it, and draw from our own hopes and longings the
inference that such a consciousness is incomplete in itself?
It is obvious then that the world of persons is made up

of such scraps of consciousness, all falling short of complete-

ness.

Mind is not the complete fully conscious entity we

supr-ose it to be.

On the contrary, it is only partially aware

of its world in that its experience is partial.

The human

mind demands some wider concept within which it will find its
place, for only within such a concept can we ascribe to it

adequate meaning.
It in the belief of the idealist that we are Inevitably

led to postulate • 'Consciousness
fragments.

1

which is the sum of the

His aim is to achieve completeness and to account

at the same time for the obviously incomplete nature of human

experience.

This completeness cannot lie within objects in

isolation but can only be found within the whole olosely

interwoven structure of the world.
The known demands a knower and we can only postulate

existence for those things which enter into consciousness.
does not invalidate the supposition that there may be many
things which are not known and which do not depend for their

existence upon being known.

This is not a point of issue to

an idealist, who has denied nothing except such denials as

may be implicit in the statement that human experience is

This
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incomplete and limited.
The principle of completeness eo necessary to the idealist

provides an eccount of the world which can be said to be adequate in so far as it embraces all those beliefs which have
been established as true beyond all reasonable doubt.

It

follows thst the world cannot contain contradictions and the
meln function of reason if to reconcile apparent contradictions.

Nor is there room for a belief in

I

separate world of material

things which is the peculiar field of science.

The idealist is aiming at a monistic conception of the

world which will bold together uncler rigid examination.

It

is not an ides which can be attacked by science because it

finds room within it for the verified conclusions of science.
It coeB refute the assumptions of materialism and rejects the

impersonal nature of mechanical law, for the idealist maintains
above al3 that thought precedes matter and is not merely an

episode in the history of matter.

Behind material existence

there must be thought as the prir.al necessity.
One can readily understand Royce's objection to the

usually facile description of personality as hopelessly inadequate to describe the nature of the universal mind.

For the

ultimate consciousness is a structure of thought Inaccessible
to our complete understanding.

What value does Idealism give to the human mind?
only a limited value and yet it does- not disparage it.

Obviously
The
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real value of our minds is their contributions to the harmony
of the whole,

in clarifying true knowledge, and in establishing

those elements of truth which admit of no contradiction and

which will lead us into a fuller understanding of absolute
experience.

Mind to the idealist is too big a concept for the human
mind to fulfill adequately.

Each human individual mind is

part of a larger all-inclusive mind.

It would be presumptuous

to describe this latter in terms of some super-personality,

for a fragment of anything is incapable of describing its

whole, or of having any idea as to the real nature of the
whole.

Unity is a basic law of the universe.

We see this born

out in every field of learning and ere led to believe that

some larger unity, some overall harmony, in which our

incomplete minds shall find their completeness, is a neoessary
conclusion.

How this is brought about is a matter of opinion.
Idealists differ radically among themselves.

For

It is clear

that if your idealism finds its roots in a theistic, self-

conscious conception of Mind, then completeness will be

achieved in a very different manner than would be the case if
your inclinations took you to conceive of an impersonal,

non-conscious World-Mind.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

THE PROBLEM STATED

Among the divergent philosophies which have been considered there are certain distinctive trends which are marked

by an emphasis upon either the functional or the metaphysical
concepts of mind.

It would he untrue to say that these

philosophical systems were clear cut and definitive.

There

is a wide range of agreement among them and an equally wide

range of disagreement.

Speculation regarding the nature of mind is considered
in several ways

tion of mind,

(b)

(a)

that intellect is the highest manifesta-

that the phenomenon of consciousness 16 all

we can legitimately call mind, and (c) that the soul possesses
all these faculties as diverse expressions of a single entity.

Even withinthese several categories there is no complete

agreement as to the exact connotations of Intellect, consciousness and soul.

There are however, certain broad principles

which are generally accepted and referred to as common sense.
It is upon this latter element that we shall venture to review

these three categories of mind.
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THE MIND A3 INTELLECT

I33UE3 INVOLVED
*fe

may begin by defining intellect as that cognitive

faculty of mind which is capable of conceptual thought.

If

intellect, however, reveals all that is unique in mind we
still have not established the nature of thought.

Can we say

that mind is what it does without finding ourselves confronted

by the dilemma,

•Just how does it do anything

1

?

If intellect is a purely organic phenomenon then how
are we to account for the immaterial nature of ideas?

The great

problem is the perennial one of trying to ^certain the nature
of the transition of object to subject so that it becomes

knowledge.

Fhysiology cannot explain apprehension and it would

seem that this is the stumbling block, over which, those who

elevate intellect as the chief quality of mind, needs must

find a way.

SOLUTIONS OFFERED
The solutions offered are either metaphysical as in the

case of Aristotle or instrumental as in the case of John Dewey.
I.

Aristotle was convinced of the immaterial nature of

thought and Intellection.

He saw intellect as a process at

work actualizing the potential intelligibility of matter.

By

his postulating of universal forms he was able to bring into
close relationship both the metaphysical and the physical
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aspects of mind and thus resolve this dilemma.

An object

became actualized when it became intelligible.

Just exactly

what these forms were per se Aristotle could not say.

They

were a convenient postulate.
2.

dualism.

John Dewey refused to be dismayed by any apparent
He simply dismissed such

a

upon a wrong approach to the subject.

contention as founded

Mind was a product of

evolution and as a part of a complex nervous structure

functioned in a particular way.

Intellect was a means of

facilitating ends and had evolved out of necessity.

GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Undoubtedly one of the most successful approaches to the
study of mind is that which stresses ratiocination as pre-

eminently the substance of mind.

The ability to conceive of

ideas, to co-ordinate and assemble these ideas is surely of

all mental phenomena most singular and unique.

Will and

feeling may perchance be found among the lower creatures in

rudimentary form but man alone forms judgments, and man only
is able to utilize his past experiences, associate his Ideas

and confront any present situation fortified by his ability
to think 'through'

his problems.

Plato as well as Aristotle were profoundly moved by this

function of mind but were not persuaded to state that mind is
this and nothing else.

They were all too cognizant of the

fact that mind oould not be adequately described in terms of

6k

Intellect.

Instrument.

Undoubtedly the intellect la a unique and majeatlc
It Is more than reminiscence and it is far more

than a passive cognition of sense data.

The Intellect is a

creative and forceful reality by means of which the phenomena
of the sensible world are woven into the fabric of human

existence.

It is an amazing ability by means of which the

self and the other are brought Into coherent relationship.
It is by the Intellect that we are able to evaluate,

to

weigh the pros and oons of any situation and to make Judgments.

The veracity of the Judgments made is inconsequential

for the feet remains that the Judgments are the outcome of

reflective thinking.

We are able to draw inferences from

what has already happened regarding what will probably happen
In the future.

It has been argued by Dewey that these are

little more than the habits of experience rather than reflection.

This is probably true in a limited degree but the fact

Is that we are not entirely the slaves of experience and the

element of free choice is indicative of some reflective powers.

However scornfully the behaviorlnt may reject this suggestion
one is persuaded that intellect does possess certain freedoms.

No previous conditioning could explain my departure into

thoughts of abstract Justice or into thoughts of the infinite
or Into the voluntarily relinquishing of my own good for some

ideal end.

It is intellect alone which enables me to weigh one

set of Ideals against another and to argue in behalf of my

choice.
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Why then should there he any feeling of inadequacy when
we describe the mind as simply Intellect?

It is because there

is an indefinable disquiet which permeates all our thought

end forces upon us the feeling that we are not to be so

analysed in such simple terms.

We are composite creatures and

the Intellect is a part of the whole.

The primacy of the

intellect in the existence of the individual is without quesIt is a means of his knowing and thinking and questioning.

tion.

Mind however, is more than what it does.

Thought is basically

a metaphysical Phenomenon as Aristotle discerned and which

Descartes saw as the fundamental problem of philosophy.

The

fact is, that we move among the physical objects within ex-

perience in an intelligible way, only because of a metaphysical
nexus.

However strenuously this may be repudiated the fact

seems plain that thought is of a non-physical nature.
It would appear then that those philosophers who reject

the intellect as a means of attaining true knowledge are

trying to bring thought into a rational framework wherein the

only truth is that which is immediate and expedient.

The first

step taken paradoxically enough, is to disparage the trust-

worthiness of mental experiences.

We use a discredited medium

for the purpose of proving something which shall be accepted
as true.

The thorough going skepticism of David Hume is undoubtedly
a salutary thing in that it affords a disciplinary cheok upon

any tendency towards deifying the intellect.

Epiphenomenalism

.

66

is howevar, a sterile philosophy and leaves one with the

reeling that not only la It altogether too facile but It

destroys too much.

Deification of the intellect it one thing

to be avoided but a cynical lconoolaam le not the an aver.

Despite the several ways of approaching the problem, all
the philosophers whom we have considered seem to converge
arOttfldi

one 7>oint,

and Ideas
In a

— has

that the mind deals In intangible

— conoepts

recourse to memory and phantasy, and Indulges

distinct mental life.

Our difficulty arises the moment

we begin to npeoul ite as to the nature of this distinctiveness

We find ourselves oonfronted by at least two main sohools
of thought.

somehow one.

Either life an we know it is dualistic or It la

Bertrand Russell in his theory of knowledge

prefers to think of matter and mind as two aspeota of one subetanoe In continual flux.

It in however, no whit easier to

think of one aspect of matter apprehending what it itself was
or is to be.

It is a peculiar weakness of most of us to feel

that if we own reduce mind to matter then we have neareu a

solution to our problem.

Nonetheless Dewey fails to carry

oonvlction with his purely functional definition of mind,
which is merely exchanging old dogmas for new.

It is precisely

here where idealism takes over and, as it were, turns the

hour-glass upside down again.
as our problem is concerned.

We arrive where we b<*gan ae far
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THE MIND A3 CONSCIOUSNESS

ISSUES INVOLVED
Ib consciousness a thing in itself?

Ia it possible to

determine the value of consciousness as thft wrlch is dominant
among- the various activities of mind?

Indee<i

can Intellect

be other than consciousness in particular foci?

Self-conscious-

ness is denied by Hume, whose contention it is that we are

never aware of anything other than perceptions.

The self is

If this Is true why is the idea of the

a pure illusion.

self so deeply implanted as to make its denial a matter of

incredulity?

Consciousness is not, of course, confined to selfconsciousness.

It can have a strictly impersonal connotation,

and in fact does have this Impersonal meaning for a great
many philosophers.

The question then arises

M

to its nature

and what relationship human consciousness has to that con-

sciousness whloh seeks ende and achieves purposes

lr

the

absence of apparent intelligence?

SOLUTIONS 0F7KRED
1.

Both Augustine and Descartes were agreed that consciousness

is our chief rowans of attaining certitude.

It is the supreme

mind
certainty and although we may be inclined to think of
to begin with tht
in more comprehensive terms, we are forced

fact of human consciousness.

Both of these philosophers
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believed in the s-ul as

a

personal entity.

Consciousness of

self (soul) was accepted, not as a probability but as our

only real certainty.
2.

Bergson'e idea of consciousness is as an instrument of

action.

It is not an entity but a vital responsiveness.

is consciousness launched into matter".

"Life

He sees consciousness

as an expression of an impersonal vital urge into wakefulness,

from the unknown to the

knowji,

from the quiescent to the

lively.

3.

Hume would go no further in his search for the self than

the study of consciousness.

dearly that there

Consciousness shows all too

is no such entity, for consciousness Itself

is merely the awareness of certain perceptions.

Consciousness

and perception are synonymous.

GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Consciousness accompanies intellect and yet it is possible for the intellect to wor* when active ewareness is not

present.

By active awareness is meant the active cognisance

of one's surroundings.

The mind is at work a large part of

the time in the absence of such awareness.

It is however,

this conscious "awareness" which is, above all else, the

38.

Henri Berg son, Creative Evolution
& Co., 1919, r.T^r:
'

,

London:

Kacmillan
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subject of endless speculation.

Perhaps we express consciousness most pertinently when
we speak of self-consciousness.
of th-

self?

What is it to he oonseiou.s

It is the capacity to indulge in introspection.

We are not compelled to direct our consciousness outside of
ourselves.

We are not dependent upon some external object

to provide the locus of consciousness as we assume to be the

case in animal life.

We have the capacity to contemplate

our own thoughts, analyse our thought processes and see ourselves objectively.

The ability to do this caused first

Augustine, and later Descartes, to state it as the one given

certitude of personal existence.

It is true that Hume

dismisses any ideas we may cherish about the •self

1

,

but the

feeling or intuition of this inner unity as an entity is
strong and reassuring.
It is one of philosophy^ perennial problems to find

some grounds for the belief in the existence of other minds,

although it is generally accepted by common sense that other
minds are Just as real as are our own.

In actual fact we

rarely think of self -consciousness as ooncerned primarily
with the self alone.

Without being too analytical we take

for granted that the self is capable of a vicarious existence
in that it can enter Into a sympathetic relationship with the

consciousness of other minds.

There are some excellent

psychological reasons for this ability of course but these do
not tend to invalidate the joint at issue.

The point stressed

a
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is not why or for what reason we share the feelings and emo-

tions of others, hut the fact that we do it at all, and have
so little reason to Acuta! its validity.

3elf -consciousness

is in a measure hetero-consciousness.

It is on the basis of ooramon sense that we think of

•awareness' as being in a sense diffused.

The sense of one-

ness with our fellow creatures would not be possible were it
not for this common mental background.

Idealism has been

quick to recognize this fact and has constructed a philosophy

upon its possible Implications.

It would be foolish however,

for us to assume that there is little else involved.

Despite

this common backdrop of mental states and the metaphysical

merging of suoh mental states, there is that quality of vital
awareness which is also distinctly individual.

How it arises

is a question open to conjecture and one answer is usually as

good as another.

Augustine answers simply that it is an act of God

—

divine co-operating principle vouchsafed to man alone, making

him "..little lower than the angels".

This is perhaps too

unsophisticated an answer to satisfy many philosophers.
3t.

Thomas Aquinas was not disconcerted when he was

faced with the inability of the mind to answer its own questioning.

When we have exhausted the possibilities of reason

to resolve our dilemmas then we must leap across the unknown

by faith.

Perhaps both St. Thomas and Augustine, far from

forsaking the path of true philosophy have found the path to
wisdom.
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Conscious awareness is, one feels, more than the natural
result of a complex nervous structure.

To assume that the

more complex a particular organism becomes the oloser it moves
towards self -recognition as a living thing is an unwarranted

assumption in the absence of a teleological theology.
Self-consciousness is not however, the whole nature of
mind.

Mind has considerably wider implications and not only

manifests itself in the rhenomena of intellect, imagination,
memory and so on, but even more remarkably in intuition.

Indeed the mind would be without its data were it not
for the relationships provided by the intuitive function.

Intuition is our link with reality and it la this same faculty

which provides the stuff of knowledge which now directs our
consideration of the soul.

THE MIND A3 SOUL

ISSUES INVOLVED
The general tendency among philosophers has been to refer
to the soul from a purely functional point of view.

It Is a

convenient term for denoting all the various properties of
the living organism.

The question arises however, as to what

ultimate value, if any, the soul possesses.

Is the soul

separable or is it doomed to extinction when the organism dies?
The problem is important in that, If the soul has a value in

itself and Is of a separable nature, then we face the possibility
of its destiny being of far more importance than its present
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workings.

If on the other hand It is inseparably bound up

with the body, then undoubtedly, its present functions are
of greatest importance In any study.

The soul has come to

have certain theological meanings and to use the word in any

other context seems to be unwise and leads to misunderstanding.
That this is the case is one of the misfortunes of philosophy.

30LUTIQN3 OFFERED
As we have already observed the soul has been referred
to in many different contexts.
St.

Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,

Thomas, Descartes and the idealists all speak of the soul

and the problem resolves itself into one of definition.
1.

To Plato, Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, the soul was

the self.

It was immaterial and separable from the body.

It

implied a continuum of memory, and while it could not be

narrowed down to either intellect or consciousness, it was

both of these things.
2.

Aristotle and Descartes use the word because it con-

veniently expresses a variety of functions, no one of which
is capable of describing the full context of mind.

The soul

however is that which actualizes the body or provides the
dynamic impulse.

It is questionable if the soul can retain

its identify after the death of the body.
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GrSNERAL CONSIDERATION

Just as we are intuitively aware of the relationships

between objects in experience, so also are we sensitive to
the oneness of all mental phenomena.

We do not attempt to

separate intellect and consciousness, nor do we think of

memory and imagination as other than the several expressions
of a unified mental life.

We are cognizant of the subtle

connectedness of all these phases of activity within the stream
of consciousness.

Plato's belief in two distinct worlds is an emphasis upon
the prior place of the soul in the life of man.

more than shape, colour, texture

—we

We apprehend

discern ideas by the

bringing together of all these things into an Intelligible
relationship.

The idea which is prior to the object is of the

nature of pure reality.
a synthesis?

How are

x^e

able to bring about suoh

By reason of the fact that the soul is divine

and able to go beyond the sensible qualities of things to the

immaterial nature of the idea.
In a word, Plato was pointing out that it is the thinking

reasoning, understanding mind as a whole which makes life the
vital experience it is.

Analyze mind ae we will, the sum of

its functioning is to make a body into a man, to turn a world

into an object of contemplation and wonder.

This is not

brought about by any one partioular function but by the mind
at work as a whole.

We are confident that man is unique in

his possession of these powers of comprehension which single

7^

him out from all sentient creatures.
fact In several ways.

We may account for this

We may for Instance account for It as

having evolved through natural laws to a supernatural status,
from the simple to the oomplex, or we may account for It
a single creative act of God.

in the other It is determined.

"by

In the one case It Is fortuitous,

Whatever decision we oome to,

It must be made within the mind itself.

It must be the out-

come of a psycho-physical process.
Let us consider this for a moment.

ourselves as "being"

,

We are oonscious of

not Just as bodies, but somehow as inner

spectators looking out.

We make the postulate that apart from

this body, the soul (or mind) "is".

This is a logical belief

and the question "How do we know?" is Irrelevant.

The

ontologioal antithesis would be that the soul "isn't" whioh
is beyond thought to conceive.

It may be suggested that the

problem itself is a false one in that it is generated by
physloal impulses whose complexity and organization makes it

pos?ible to conjure false data.

In other words the psychical

is a oondition of the physical.

But il It not possible that we are approaching the problem
from the wrong end?

May not the body (indeed all matter) be

a mode of the paychioal?

The soul contemplates the body.

is not the body which contemplates the soul.

It

If soul is an

appanage of body then also are thought, intuition and all
psycluoal powers.

This is all the more difficult to believe

in that the present trend of scientific theory is to rob matter
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more and more of its solidity and even of its rational order

(Heisenberg

1

I

principle of indeterminacy).

The philosophers of every age have tried to resolve this

problem of soul.

Each has oaught a partial truth and each

has helped to elucidate the problem for others by demonstrating
the weakness or the indubitableness of many conceptions.

No

one system of philosophy possesses all the truth and there Is
a need for an integration of those truths which serve to make

for an acceptable philosophy.

Whatever the views of philosophers, one fact emerges
v^ry clearly, the nature of mind and the nature of mind's

relation to matter is by no means determined.
the greatest of all mysteries
the universe.

— the

It is still

most sublime creation in

i
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